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ONCE MENTALLY ILL, ALWAYS A DANGER? LIFETIME BANS ON
GUN OWNERSHIP UNDER FIRE FOLLOWING INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT
Amanda Pendel*
ABSTRACT
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) imposes a lifetime ban on those who
have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution from
purchasing, or possessing a firearm, regardless of an extended passage
of time, or a finding that the individual is unlikely to pose a danger to
themselves or the public. Three circuits have created a split concerning
the constitutionality of this statute. The Third Circuit held in Beers v.
Attorney General United States that those involuntarily committed
were outside of the scope of the Second Amendment; therefore, the §
922(g)(4)’s categorical ban is constitutional. Next, the Ninth Circuit in
Mai v. United States assumed, without deciding, that these same
individuals are inside of the scope of the Second Amendment but held
§ 922(g)(4) constitutional under intermediate scrutiny as applied to
those whose commitments were long ago. Finally, the Sixth Circuit
held in Tyler v. Hillsdale City Sheriff’s Department, that individuals
such as Tyler, who had been involuntarily committed into a mental
institution, were within the Second Amendment’s scope. The Sixth
Circuit held § 922(g)(4) unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny.
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INTRODUCTION

There is often a stigma forcibly attached to those who have
been involuntarily committed to mental institutions, despite the lack of
evidence to support any continued danger to themselves or society.
Congress perpetuates this stigma in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) by imposing
a permanent gun ownership ban on those who have been involuntarily
“committed to a mental institution,” regardless of how much time has
elapsed since the committal or the previously committed person’s
current mental state.1 Although two potential avenues for relief from
this categorical, lifetime ban exist, one is currently a nullity and the
other is only available to citizens of certain states.
The federal circuit courts disagree on the constitutionality of
this lifetime ban. The majority, consisting of the Third and Ninth
Circuits, held in Beers v. Attorney General United States 2 and Mai v.
United States,3 respectively, that a lifetime gun ban does not violate
the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.4
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit held, in Tyler v. Hillsdale City Sheriff’s
Department,5 that a lifetime ban on gun ownership is a clear violation
of the Second Amendment.6
This unsettled dispute has been a source of recent debate, and
the circuits have not come to a meaningful resolution.7 Nonetheless,
current case law demonstrates the need to consider the indefiniteness
of the lifetime ban imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) due to arguments
asserting that after a passage of time, individuals no longer present a
threat to society or themselves. While it is important to respect every
citizen's right to due process, it is equally imperative to prevent

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution
. . . [to] possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.”).
2
927 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2020).
3
952 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2019).
4
U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Second Amendment provides “[a] well-regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
5
837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016).
6
Id. at 699.
7
See Beers, 927 F.3d at 158; Mai, 952 F.3d at 1109; and Tyler, 837 F.3d at 681.
1
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mentally unstable individuals from harming themselves by limiting
their access to firearms.8
This Note will be divided into five sections. Section II will
discuss the history of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) as it applies to those
involuntarily committed to a mental institution. Section III will
analyze the circuit split including the majority and minority decisions.
Section IV will examine which circuit has made the proper decision.
Finally, Section V will conclude the Note.
II.

HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 922(G)(4)

Section 922(g)(4) provides that firearm possession is unlawful
for those who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or
committed to a mental institution under § 922(g)(4).9 The Code of
Federal Regulations defines “adjudicated as a mental defective” to
include, “[a] determination by a court, board, commission, or other
lawful authority that a person, as a result of . . . mental illness. . . [i]s a
danger to himself or to others . . . .”10 The Code further defines
“committed to a mental institution” as a “[f]ormal commitment of a
person to a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or other
lawful authority,” including “commitment to a mental institution
involuntarily” and “commitment for mental defectiveness or mental
illness.”11
Although individuals who have been involuntarily committed
to a mental hospital are barred from possessing a firearm, federal law
provides two “potential” avenues to obtain relief from the § 922(g)(4)
bar.12 These two options seem to provide individuals with a
meaningful opportunity to restore their Second Amendment right;
however, the first option is no longer viable and the second option is
only available to those living in one of the thirty states with eligible
state-run programs under 34 U.S.C. § 40915.
Pursuant to the first avenue, an individual may apply under 18
U.S.C. § 925(c) to the United States Attorney General for relief from
the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the possession

8

See id.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2015).
10
27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019).
11
See id.
12
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1111.
9
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of firearms.13 The Attorney General may, but is not required to, grant
relief
if it is established to his satisfaction that the
circumstances regarding the disability, and the
applicant's record and reputation, are such that the
applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous
to public safety and that the granting of the relief would
not be contrary to the public interest.14
However, since 1992, Congress has withheld funds to prevent the
implementation of § 925(c) because eligibility became “a very difficult
and subjective task which could have devastating consequences for
innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made.”15 Accordingly, until
Congress funds this program, relief under § 925(c) is unavailable.
Under the second option, relief is solely provided through an
eligible state-run program under 34 U.S.C. § 40915.16 Although this
avenue for restoration sounds promising, it is not available in every
state. Currently, only thirty states have created programs that qualify,
thus leaving residents of twenty states with no alternative.17 In order
to be deemed eligible, the program must “‘permit a person who,
pursuant to State law . . . has been committed to a mental institution,
to apply to the State for relief from the disabilities imposed by 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) and other Laws.”18 Additionally, the program is
required to provide that
a State court, board, commission, or other lawful
authority shall grant the relief, pursuant to State law and
in accordance with the principles of due process, if the
circumstances regarding the disabilities . . . and the
person's record and reputation, are such that the person
will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public
13

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2019)).
18 U.S.C. § 925 (2019); see United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 77 (2002) (noting
the discretionary nature of the decision and observing that relief may be denied “even
when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied”).
15
S. REP. NO. 102-353 (1992).
16
34 U.S.C. § 40915 (2017).
17
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement
Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009–2018, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp
&tid=491 (providing state-by-state information suggesting that thirty states and one
tribe have qualifying programs) (last visited Sep. 16, 2020).
18
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1111–12 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 40915).
14
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safety and that the granting of the relief would not be
contrary to the public interest.19
Furthermore, state programs must allow residents to petition to the
state court “for a de novo judicial review of [a] denial.” 20 If someone
is granted relief under a qualifying state program, the lifetime ban on
the possession of firearms under § 922(g)(4) does not apply.21
Other states, such as Washington, have attempted to create
qualifying programs but have failed because the factual findings
required by the state differ from the federal requirements under §
40915.22 For example, Washington law requires a factual finding that
the applicant “no longer present[s] a substantial danger to himself or
herself, or the public.”23 This differs from the federal standard, which
requires that “the person will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous
to public safety.”24 Since the federal standard is more demanding than
the state standard, as the latter only requires a finding that individual
is not a substantial threat to his own safety or that of the public, and
the former standard necessitates a finding that the individual is unlikely
to pose a danger to the public, it fails to meet the federal requirements
under § 40915 and is thus unenforceable under the supremacy clause.25
Unless states, like Washington, heighten the standards of their
programs to adhere to the requirements of § 40915, individuals have
no avenue for relief from § 922(g)(4)’s firearm prohibition.26
III.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Within the past decade, a circuit split has divided the courts in
determining the constitutionality of lifetime gun bans under federal
law.27 Although the circuits reach different conclusions, all apply the
same two-step inquiry to determine whether § 922(g) violates the
19

Id.
34 U.S.C. § 40915(a)(3) (2017).
21
34 U.S.C. § 40915(b) (2017).
22
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112.
23
Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.047(3)(c)(iii)) (emphasis added).
24
Id. (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 40915(a)(2) (2017)) (emphasis added).
25
Mai, 2018 WL 784582, at *1.
26
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113.
27
Compare Mai, 952 F.3d at 1121, with Beers, 927 F.3d at 159 (holding that §
922(g)(4)’s gun ban was constitutional under the Second Amendment); Tyler, 837
F.3d at 699 (holding that the gun ban imposed by § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional
under the Second Amendment).
20
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Second Amendment. Step one asks whether the challenged law
burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment. If the answer
to step one is affirmative, step two directs courts to apply an
appropriate level of scrutiny. 28 The level of scrutiny depends upon the
severity of the burden the provision places on core Second Amendment
rights.29
A.

The Majority

In 2008, the Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v.
that a long-standing regulation of firearms does not generally
impinge upon Second Amendment rights because the Second
Amendment is not unlimited. 31 The Court further noted that well
established regulations, such as those prohibiting persons with mental
illnesses from owning firearms, are presumptively lawful.32 In its
decision, the Court described self-defense at the “core” of the Second
Amendment by providing the right to bear arms for “law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”33 The
Supreme Court asserted that this right does not permit individuals to
keep and carry any weapon in any manner for whatever purpose. 34 The
Supreme Court in Heller declined to define the appropriate level of
scrutiny when determining whether a particular restriction violates the
Second Amendment, and instead, stated that the scope of a
constitutional right is the outcome of the people’s understanding at the
time of its adoption.35
Heller 30

28

Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113 (quoting United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th
Cir. 2013)).
29
Id. at 1137.
30
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
31
Id. at 596.
32
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 (the Court accentuated that its decision did not “cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools, government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.”).
33
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
34
Id.
35
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (rejecting the traditional levels of scrutiny and
explaining that the scope of enumerated rights is the product of interest balancing at
the time of enactment).
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The Ninth Circuit

Most recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Mai v.
United States, broadened the circuit split by issuing a majority opinion
in favor of § 922(g)(4)’s permanent firearm prohibition. At the age of
seventeen, Mai was involuntarily committed to a mental facility for
over nine months after threatening the safety of himself and others. 36
In the twenty years following his release, Mai received a GED, a
bachelor’s degree, and a master’s degree. 37 In addition to obtaining
gainful employment, Mai also became the father of two children. 38
According to the complaint, Mai “no longer struggle[d] from mental
illness, and he live[d] a ‘socially-responsible, well-balanced, and
accomplished life.’”39 Nonetheless, due to the condition of Mai’s
mental health over twenty years ago, he was prohibited from
purchasing or possessing a firearm. 40
In 2017, Mai filed an action in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington after he was denied the ability
to purchase a firearm under § 922(g)(4). In his complaint, he alleged
that “the government”41 violated his Second Amendment right to bear
arms and his Fifth Amendment right to due process.42 In response to
the action, the government moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim. 43 The district court granted the motion, holding that
“§ 922(g)(4) is categorically constitutional under the Second
Amendment and, alternatively, that § 922(g)(4) satisfies intermediate

36

Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. (noting that Mai claimed to have fully recovered from his mental health
condition, explaining that he was no longer taking any medication). After his release,
the plaintiff earned a bachelor’s in microbiology from the University of Washington
and a master’s in microbiology from the University of Southern California. Id. He
then worked as a researcher, including at the Benaroya Research Institute, where he
underwent and passed an FBI background check. Id.
40
Id. Although Washington law allows citizens to petition for relief from the state
law prohibition, the program is less stringent than federal law, and therefore is
inapplicable to Mai’s case as discussed above. Id.
41
Id. (noting that “the government” consists of the Department of Justice; the United
States Attorney General; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives collectively).
42
Id.
43
Id.
37
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scrutiny.”44 Additionally, the court rejected Mai’s due process claim.45
Mai sought leave to amend his complaint; however, the amendment
was ultimately denied as futile.46 Mai proceeded with a timely appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 47
On appeal, Mai argued that he should be allowed to possess
firearms, notwithstanding his earlier involuntary commitment. 48 The
court noted that Mai never asserted an equal protection claim based
upon Washington State’s failure to have a qualifying program under §
40915 as opposed to thirty other states which do have such programs.
The court further noted that Mai did not advance a due process claim
on appeal.49 For these reasons, the only issue analyzed on appeal was
whether the Second Amendment required that Mai have the ability to
possess a firearm.50
The Ninth Circuit, along with the other circuits in the split,
applied a two-step inquiry to determine whether § 922(g) violates the
Second Amendment.51 The first step is to determine whether the law
being challenged burdens conduct protected by the Amendment. 52 To
establish a burden on protected conduct, the court must “explore the
amendment's reach based on a historical understanding of the scope of
the Second Amendment right.”53 The court will look at the customary
justifications for barring a class of individuals from possessing guns
and ask whether the challenger is able to distinguish his circumstances
from those individuals in the historically-barred class.54 If a law falls
within a presumptively lawful regulatory measure, or regulates
conduct that historically has fallen outside the scope of the Second
Amendment, it does not place a burden on Second Amendment
rights.55
44

Id.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 1113.
49
Id.
50
Id.; see Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
arguments not raised in the opening brief are forfeited).
51
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113.
52
United States v. Torres, 911 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States
v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013)).
53
Torres, 911 F.3d at 1258.
54
Id. at 1253.
55
Id.
45
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Once step one is satisfied, courts then move to step two, which
applies an appropriate level of scrutiny.56 Three tiers of scrutiny are
available for courts to apply when determining whether a challenged
law is consistent with the Constitution, rational basis review,
intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. 57 “[T]here has been near
unanimity demonstrated in case law that, when considering regulations
that fall within the scope of the Second Amendment, intermediate
scrutiny is appropriate.”58 For this reason, in Mai’s case, and most
cases considering regulations falling under the Second Amendment,
intermediate scrutiny is applied. 59
The Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that § 922 (g)(4)
as applied to Mai burdened his Second Amendment rights satisfying
step one of the two-step analysis.60 Under step two, the court
determined that intermediate scrutiny should apply because “a person
who required formal intervention and involuntary commitment by the
State because of the person's dangerousness is not a ‘law-abiding,
responsible citizen.’”61 For that reason alone, the court found that §
922(g)(4)’s prohibition fell well outside the core of the Second
Amendment, since the statute only burdens a narrow class of
individuals, instead of the public at large. 62 The court further
elaborated that this regulation was "presumptively lawful" based upon
historical evidence supporting that the mentally ill were not entrusted
to hold the responsibility of bearing arms. 63
In order to withstand intermediate scrutiny, § 922(g)(4) must
promote a substantial government interest that would be achieved less

56

Torres, 911 F.3d at 1257 (quoting United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136
(9th Cir. 2013)).
57
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the Rational-Basis test to
only require the government to demonstrate a “reasonable relationship” between the
law at issue and a “legitimate governmental objective for the law to withstand the
challenge. Further, intermediate scrutiny requires the government to demonstrate that
a law’s objective is significant, substantial, or important” and that there is a
reasonable fit between the law and its objective. Last, strict scrutiny requires the
government to provide a compelling interest to substantiate the law at issue.).
58
Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Torres, 911
F.3d at 1262).
59
Id. at 1114.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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successfully absent the statute.64 In this case, the Ninth Circuit held
that § 922(g)(4)’s application withstood intermediate scrutiny because
of two compelling interests: (1) preventing crime; and (2) preventing
suicide.65 When enacting § 922(g), Congress intended to keep firearms
away from presumptively risky people, such as those who have been
involuntarily committed into a mental institution by allowing
categorical bans on groups of individuals who presently pose an
increased risk of violence. 66
On appeal, Mai argued that the continued application of the
prohibition [wa]s no longer justified due to the passage of time and his
alleged mental health in recent years. 67 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
relying on scientific evidence cited by the government that establishes
a heightened risk of violence for those who have been released from
involuntary commitment.68 The court relied on a meta-analysis, which
analyzed the relationship between a history of mental illness and the
apparent risk of suicide.69 The analysis found that those released from
involuntary commitment reported a combined suicide risk thirty-nine
times higher than expected.70 The court reasoned that the study’s
findings justified the need to enforce § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition. 71
Despite the presence of scientific evidence, Mai argued that the
findings were not a perfect match for his situation. 72 According to this
evidence, the suicide risk following an involuntary commitment is at
its highest point at release and slowly “diminishes thereafter.” 73 Mai
argued that the studies the court relied upon only followed outcomes
of individuals released from involuntary commitment for up to 8.5
years; meanwhile, Mai was released over twenty years ago, had no

64

Torres, 911 F.3d at 1263 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1116.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1117.
68
Id.
69
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1117 (quoting E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as
an Outcome for Mental Disorders: A Meta-Analysis, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205,
221 (1997) (emphasis added) (defining “the ‘expected’ rate of suicide as either the
rate calculated by the authors of the individual study or the background rate for the
general population of the relevant country, controlling for years of the study, age,
and gender”).
70
Id.
71
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1117.
72
Id.
73
Id.
65
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further mental health issues, and no longer posed a threat to himself or
others.74
The court agreed in part and held that, although those who were
involuntarily committed decades ago and are no longer considered
mentally ill “unquestionably pose less of a risk of violence now than
when a state court found them to be mentally ill and dangerous[,] . . .
scientific evidence reasonably supports the congressional judgment
that they nevertheless still pose an increased risk of violence.” 75 The
court relied upon other studies, which included a variety of treatment
types,76 tracked patients for up to fifteen years, and found a reported
suicide risk eleven times higher than expected.77
The Ninth Circuit used the studies to conclude that, although
the risks of suicide and violence lessen over time, there was no
evidence to suggest that the risk would ever dissipate entirely. 78 This
circuit further agreed with the Sixth Circuit, that the Second
Amendment does not warrant “‘an individualized hearing’ to assess
one’s personal level of risk.” 79 The court reasoned that even if it
considered the facts specifically pertaining to Mai, nowhere in his
record did it suggest that his “level of risk [wa]s nonexistent or that his
level of risk matche[d] the risk associated with a similarly situated
person who lack[ed] a history of mental illness.”80
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit expressly stated that 34 U.S.C. §
40915 did not affect its analysis of the case at bar. 81 The Ninth Circuit
recognized that the Sixth Circuit had held that § 40915 “is a clear
indication that Congress does not believe that previously committed
persons are sufficiently dangerous as a class” to prohibit citizens from
possessing firearms. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit interpreted this
law differently.82 The court in Mai’s case believed that Congress
74

Id.
Id.
76
Id. (stating that different treatment types include inpatient, out-patient, voluntary,
and community care).
77
E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for Mental Disorders:
A Meta-Analysis, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 221 (1997).
78
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1118.
79
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 698 n.18; see also Torres, 911 F.3d at 1264 n.6 (holding that,
when applying intermediate scrutiny, a level of over-inclusiveness for a firearms
prohibition is permissible).
80
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 698.
81
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1119.
82
Id.
75
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enacted § 40915 to improve the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System (“NICS”).83 The court reasoned that including an
avenue for relief under § 40915 was merely a political compromise
that provided the possibility of relief to the least dangerous citizens in
exchange for “greatly improved enforcement as to all the rest,
including the most dangerous.”84
The Ninth Circuit concluded that, although it did not subscribe
to the notion that “once mentally ill, always so” and accepted that Mai
was no longer mentally ill, the federal prohibition placed on firearms
possession withstood Second Amendment scrutiny.85 Further, the
court held that the Second Amendment “allow[ed] Congress to further
its goal of preventing gun violence by barring [Mai] from possessing a
firearm” and affirmed the decision of the lower court.86
2.

The Third Circuit

The second case included in the majority was filed in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by
Bradley Beers, who asserted that § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional as
applied to him.87
83

See 34 U.S.C. § 40902. A relief from disabilities program is implemented by a
State in accordance with this section if the program
(1) permits a person who, pursuant to State law, has been adjudicated as
described in subsection (g)(4) of section 922 of Title 18 or has been
committed to a mental institution, to apply to the State for relief from the
disabilities imposed by subsections (d)(4) and (g)(4) of such section by
reason of the adjudication or commitment;
(2) provides that a State court, board, commission, or other lawful
authority shall grant the relief, pursuant to State law and in accordance
with the principles of due process, if the circumstances regarding the
disabilities referred to in paragraph (1), and the person's record and
reputation, are such that the person will not be likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be
contrary to the public interest; and
(3) permits a person whose application for the relief is denied to file a
petition with the State court of appropriate jurisdiction for a de novo
judicial review of the denial.

Id. The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) is
a federal background-check system listing individuals who are not
permitted to possess a firearm for a variety of reasons.
84
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1119.
85
Id. at 1121.
86
Id.
87
Beers, 927 F.3d at 152.
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On December 28, 2005, Beers was involuntarily admitted for
psychiatric treatment after placing a gun inside of his mouth and
confessing to his mother that he was suicidal. 88 During Beers’s 120hour involuntary hold, the examining physician concluded that Beers
was suicidal and that in-patient treatment was necessary for his
safety.89 On December 29, 2005, and again on January 3, 2006,
Beers’s involuntary commitment was extended as per Sections 303 and
304 of Pennsylvania’s Mental Health Procedure Act (“MHPA”),
because the court determined Beers was “severely mentally disabled
and in need of treatment.”90
Beers did not have any further mental health treatment since
his release in 2006. 91 Following his discharge, Beers attempted to
purchase a firearm but was denied because his background check
reported his prior involuntary commitment to a mental institution. 92 In
2013, Beers was examined by a physician who concluded that Beers
was now able “to safely handle firearms again without risk of harm to
himself or others; however, due to § 922(g)(4), Beers remain[ed]
prohibited from possessing a firearm.”93
The district court held that, based on precedent, evidence of
Beers’s rehabilitation was irrelevant and could not distinguish him

88

Id. at 150.
Id.: see also 50 PA. C.S. § 7302 (“Emergency examination may be undertaken at a
treatment facility upon the certification of a physician stating the need for such
examination.”).
90
Beers, 927 F.3d at 152; see also 50 PA. C.S. § 7303(a) (“Application for extended
involuntary emergency treatment may be made for any person who is being treated
pursuant to section 302 whenever the facility determines that the need for emergency
treatment is likely to extend beyond 120 hours.”); Id. at § 7304(a)(2) (“Where a
petition is filed for a person already subject to involuntary treatment, it shall be
sufficient to represent, and upon hearing to reestablish . . . that his condition
continues to evidence a clear and present danger to himself or others ….”).
91
Beers, 927 F.3d at 153.
92
Id.
93
Id.
89

While the government's motion to dismiss Beers's complaint in the
District Court was still pending, a Pennsylvania court restored Beers's
state law right to possess a firearm, pursuant to 18 PA. C.S. § 6105(f),
which allows the restoration of state gun ownership rights. Because §
6105(f) does not satisfy federal requirements allowing for
acknowledgement by the federal government of the state's restoration of
gun rights, Beers remains subject to the prohibition of § 922(g)(4).

Id.; see Pub. L. No. 110-180 § 105 (2008).
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from others in a similar situation. 94 As a result, the district court ruled
that § 922(g)(4) did not impose a burden on conduct protected by the
Second Amendment, and, therefore, the district court found the
provision constitutional as applied to Beers. 95 Beers appealed the
district court’s rejection of his challenge of § 922(g)(4) to the Third
Circuit.96
The Third Circuit applied the same two-step analysis as the
Ninth and Sixth Circuits. However, Beers was unable to establish step
one of the analysis because he could not prove that § 922(g)(4)
burdened conduct falling within the scope of the Second
Amendment.97 Although Beers claimed to be rehabilitated, he failed
to distinguish himself from “the historically barred class of mentally
ill individuals who were excluded from Second Amendment protection
because of the danger they had posed to themselves and others.”98
The Third Circuit concluded that Beers was properly identified
as a member of the class described in § 922(g)(4) for two reasons.99
First, the court relied on the Code of Federal Regulations to define key
terms employed in § 922(g)(4) such as “adjudicated as a mental
defective,”100 “committed to a mental institution,”101 and

Id. at 153; see also Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding
that mentally ill individuals subject to the prohibition under § 922(g)(4) cannot
distinguish their own personal circumstances).
95
Beers, 927 F.3d. at 155.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 157.
98
Id.
99
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2015) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (4) who has
been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental
institution; . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.”).
100
See 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019) (defining the term “Adjudicated as a mental
defective.” (a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful
authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental
illness, incompetency, condition, or disease: (1) Is a danger to himself or to others;
or (2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.)
101
Id. (stating that being committed to a mental institution means, a “[f]ormal
commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or
other lawful authority,” including “commitment to a mental institution involuntarily”
and “commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness”).
94
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“commitment to a mental institution involuntarily.”102 When reading
the definitions of these terms, Beers fell into each category. Second,
Beers was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
pursuant to state and federal regulations, making him a member of the
class of mentally ill individuals who were excluded from Second
Amendment privileges.103
Furthermore, the Third Circuit explained why those who were
considered dangerous to themselves and the public traditionally fall
outside of the scope of Second Amendment protection.104 Historically,
laws excluding the mentally ill from possessing firearms were not
necessary during the eighteenth century because “judicial officials
were authorized to ‘lock up’ so-called ‘lunatics’ or other individuals
with dangerous impairments.”105 At that time, courts reasoned that “if
taking away a lunatic’s liberty was permissible, then we should find
the ‘lesser intrusion’ of taking his or her firearms was also
permissible.”106 The Third Circuit further compared this case to
Binderup v. Attorney General.107 In Binderup, the court ruled that
those who commit a crime are excluded from the right to bear arms if
they present an actual danger of public injury. 108 The court in Binderup
further explained that “the traditional justification for disarming

See 50 PA. C.S. § 7302 (“Emergency examination may be undertaken at a
treatment facility upon the certification of a physician stating the need for such
examination ….”); see also id. at § 7303(a) (“Application for extended involuntary
emergency treatment may be made for any person who is being treated pursuant to
section 302 whenever the facility determines that the need for emergency treatment
is likely to extend beyond 120 hours.”); id. at § 7304(a)(2) (“Where a petition is filed
for a person already subject to involuntary treatment, it shall be sufficient to
represent, and upon hearing to reestablish … that his condition continues to evidence
a clear and present danger to himself or others ….”).
103
Beers, 927 F.3d at 152.
104
Id.
105
Id. See also Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District
of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1373 (2009).
The tools of deduction employed here to conclude that the mentally ill were
historically barred from gun ownership, where there is little evidence of specific
historic prohibitions. Id.
106
Jefferies v. Sessions, 278 F. Supp. 3d 831, 841 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Keyes v.
Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (M.D. Pa. 2016)).
107
836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016).
108
Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 350.
102
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mentally ill individuals was that they were considered dangerous to
themselves or the public at large. 109
To distinguish himself, Beers argued that a substantial amount
of time had passed since he had been involuntarily institutionalized and
that, due to this extended period, he was rehabilitated.110 As
established by the Third Circuit in Binderup, neither evidence of
rehabilitation nor a substantial period of time “can restore Second
Amendment rights that were forfeited . . . [and] there was no historical
support for the proposition that forfeited rights could be restored.”111
In order to challenge § 922(g)(1) under Binderup, one must distinguish
his circumstances “only by demonstrating that he was not convicted of
a serious crime, but not by demonstrating that he had reformed or been
rehabilitated.”112 In Binderup, the challengers did not commit serious
crimes, which is why a ban on their right to bear arms was
unconstitutional as applied to them.113
With Binderup as precedent, the only way Beers could
distinguish his circumstances was to establish that he was never
deemed a danger to himself or to others.114 According to the court in
Beers, it was not enough for Beers to solely establish that he no longer
posed a danger to himself or others.115 If he only had to prove the lack
of danger, this would exceed the scope of the ruling established in
Binderup that “neither passage of time nor evidence of rehabilitation
‘can restore the Second Amendment rights that were forfeited.’”116
Beers was involuntarily committed to a mental institution for those
very reasons – he admitted to feeling suicidal, and a court found him
to be a danger to himself and others.117 In addition, the Pennsylvania
state court elected to extend Beers’s commitment two separate times
due to Beers’s doctor noting that inpatient treatment was needed to
secure Beers’s safety.118

109

Id. at 351.
Beers, 927 F.3d. at 155.
111
Id. (quoting Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 350 (3d Cir. 2016).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 159.
115
Id.
116
Id. (quoting Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 350 (3d Cir. 2016)).
117
Id.
118
Id.
110
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The Minority: The Sixth Circuit

Currently, Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department119 is
the sole judicial decision of the minority opinion regarding lifetime
gun bans on those who have been involuntarily committed into mental
institutions.120 In Tyler, Clifford Charles Tyler was involuntarily
committed to a mental institution for less than a month, following an
emotional divorce.121 Although three decades passed since Tyler’s
depressive episode,122 and despite his clean bill of mental health, Tyler
was ineligible to possess a firearm under § 922(g)(4).123 After the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”)
declined to review Tyler’s petition to restore his right to own a firearm,
he sought a declaratory judgment that § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional
as applied to him.124
At the time of Tyler’s appeal, he was seventy-four years old.125
According to a substance-abuse evaluation in 1985, Tyler’s wife of
twenty-three years had an affair and left with another man, completely
depleted Tyler’s finances, and served him with divorce papers.126 As
a result, Tyler was emotionally devastated, had trouble sleeping, and
sat at home “in the middle of the floor . . . pounding his head.”127 When
this incident occurred, Tyler’s daughters feared that their father was a
danger to himself and decided to contact the local police who brought
Tyler to the Sheriff’s Department to begin the necessary steps for
Tyler’s psychological evaluation.128
119

837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016).
Federal regulations make clear that “committed to a mental institution” applies
only to persons who are involuntarily committed by an appropriate judicial authority
following due process safeguards. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (defining “committed to
a mental institution”).
121
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 681.
122
Depressive Episode, STEDMAN’S MED. DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1982) (“[A]
manifestation of a major mood disorder involving an enduring period of some or all
of the following signs: significant sadness, tearfulness, decreased appetite, weight
loss, sleep and energy disturbance, psychomotor agitation or retardation, feelings of
worthlessness, guilt, helplessness, hopelessness, decreased concentration, thoughts
of death, and suicidal ideation.”).
123
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 681.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 683.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 684 (quoting DE 1–1, Ex. C, 23).
128
Id.
120
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The doctor who examined Tyler concluded that he required inpatient treatment and petitioned the court to have him committed.129
On appeal, the court found, by “clear and convincing evidence,” that
Tyler was mentally ill.130 With this finding, the court predicted that
Tyler was expected to injure himself or others either intentionally or
unintentionally within the near future.131 Additionally, the court noted
that hospitalization was the only treatment method “adequate to meet
[Tyler’s] treatment needs.”132
Tyler was committed for a period no longer than thirty days
and was ordered to undergo additional treatment “for a period not to
exceed 90 days.”133 Upon his arrival at the institution, Tyler was
depressed and had multiple bruises on his head and face.134 He
remained in the in-patient treatment center for two to four weeks,135
but declined to take prescription medications, fearing they would alter
his “thinking.”136 After being discharged from the hospital, Tyler did
not receive any follow-up therapy.137 Once he returned home, Tyler
successfully held a job for the next eighteen years, maintained a close
relationship with his daughters, repaired his relationship with his exwife, and married his second wife in 1999.138 In 2012, Tyler
underwent a substance-abuse and psychological evaluation, where he
reported that he never experienced a depressive episode,139 other than
the one following his divorce.140
During his evaluation, Dr. Osentoski stated that Tyler’s
cognitive ability appeared to be in the “average range” and that there
was “no [present] evidence of thought disorder … [or] hallucinatory
phenomena.”141 Additionally, Tyler’s physician, Dr. Osentoski

129

Id.
Id.
131
Id. (quoting DE 1–2, Ex. F, 36).
132
Id.
133
Id. (quoting DE 1–2, Ex. F, 36-7).
134
Id.
135
Tyler's 2012 psychological evaluation notes that records from his hospitalization
at Ypsilanti Regional Center are unavailable because the regional center closed many
years ago. Id. (quoting DE 1–2, Ex. F, 36-7).
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
STEDMAN’S MED. DICTIONARY, supra note 125, at 18.
140
Tyler, 837 F.3d 678, 684-85.
141
Id. at 685 (quoting DE 1–1, Ex. B, 20).
130
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reported no signs of mental illness.142 Dr. Osentoski concluded that
“Tyler's response to his divorce was a brief reactive depressive
episode[;]” however, at the time of his evaluation, Tyler did not present
any evidence of mental illness.143 Finally, Tyler’s substance-abuse
evaluation revealed no current issues involving alcohol or drug abuse
and noted that Tyler never had substance abuse problems.144
In May 2012, Tyler sued various county, state, and federal
defendants in federal court, alleging that § 922(g)(4) was
unconstitutional as applied to him.145 Tyler asserted that because the
statute functions as a permanent ban on his fundamental Second
Amendment right and since Michigan lacked a qualifying relief-fromdisabilities program, he had no opportunity to petition for his right
back.146 Moreover, Tyler also disputed that § 922(g)(4), as applied to
him, violated the Equal Protection Clause.147 Furthermore, Tyler
claimed that the state’s failure to notify him and afford him an
opportunity to be heard amounted to a violation of the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.148 The district court
dismissed Tyler’s suit for failure to state a claim.149 The court reasoned
that Heller’s longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons and the mentally ill are “presumptively lawful” foreclosed
claims like Tyler’s.150
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
Tyler’s claim, holding that his complaint stated a valid Second
Amendment claim.151 Additionally, the court held that the government
did not carry its burden to establish that § 922(g)(4)’s permanent ban
was substantially related to the government’s important interests in
reducing crime and preventing suicide.152 The appellate court did not
understand Heller’s pronouncement regarding presumptively lawful
prohibitions to insulate § 922(g)(4) from constitutional scrutiny.153 In
142

Id. at 685.
Id. at 685 (quoting DE 1–1, Ex. B, 20).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. (discussing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
143
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the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ de novo review of the district
court’s dismissal of Tyler’s claim, the judges recognized the
importance of the Second Amendment; however, the court noted that,
like freedom of speech, the Second Amendment is not unlimited.154
The court in Tyler adopted the same two-step framework to
resolve Second Amendment challenges.155 Under step one, the
government bears the burden of conclusively demonstrating that §
922(g)(4) burdens someone included in the class of persons
historically understood to be unprotected.156 To trace the statute’s
historical lineage, the government relied on both historical scholarship
and sources. First, the government referred to a proposal presented by
the Pennsylvania anti-federalist faction at the Pennsylvania
Convention.157 The proposal stated that “no law shall be passed for
disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or
real danger of public injury from individuals.”158 Additionally, this
proposal suggested that “the said Constitution be never construed to
authorize Congress . . . to prevent the people of the United States who
are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms.”159
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court’s
finding that the historical evidence cited by the government under
Heller’s “presumptively lawful” standard does not directly establish
that individuals who were committed into an institution due to mental
illness are forever ineligible to regain their Second Amendment
rights.160 The court then proceeded to the second step of the analysis
with an understanding that individuals who have been involuntarily
committed are not categorically unprotected by the Second
Amendment.161
154

Tyler, 837 F.3d at 685.
Id.
156
Id. at 688; see U.S. v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012).
157
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 688 (quoting CA6 R. 43, Appellee).
158
Id. at 689 (quoting The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the
Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, 1787, reprinted in 2
Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, A Documentary History 665 (1971)).
159
Id, at 681.
160
Id. at 689.
161
Id. at 693 n.12 (quoting “We do not suggest that strict scrutiny will never be
applicable in a Second Amendment challenge to a gun regulation.”). See also United
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d at 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting “[t]he Second
Amendment is no more susceptible to a one-size-fits-all standard of review than any
other constitutional right. Gun-control regulations impose varying degrees of burden
155

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/15

20

Pendel: Once Mentally Ill, Always a Danger?

2022

ONCE MENTALLY ILL, ALWAYS A DANGER?

443

In this step of its analysis, the court ultimately found it was
proper to apply intermediate scrutiny in Tyler’s case. Tyler argued that
the appropriate level of scrutiny was strict scrutiny, asserting that (1)
he was “the sort of responsible, law-abiding citizen that . . . the
Supreme Court has recognized” under the Second Amendment, and (2)
§ 922(g)(4) outright extinguishes his fundamental right to use a firearm
in defense of hearth and home entirely.162
In Heller, the Court agreed that the authority to enact
categorical disqualifications was part of the original meaning of the
Second Amendment.163 Likewise, if the Court was to review §
922(g)(4) under strict scrutiny, Heller’s presumption of prohibitions
on the mentally ill would be reversed.164 Regarding Tyler’s first point,
the appellate court cautioned others against imposing too high of a
burden on Congress to justify its regulations pertaining to firearm
safety guidelines, especially in situations when the government has
elected to rely on “prior judicial determinations that individuals pose a
risk of danger to themselves or others.”165
As to Tyler’s second point, the court found that, while Tyler
was right to say that the impact of § 922(g)(4) entirely deprived him of
his core right to own and possess a firearm in defense of hearth and

on Second Amendment rights, and individual assertions of the right will come in
many forms.”). Id.
162
Id. (quoting CA6 R.53, Appellant's Suppl. Br. at 8-9).
163
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
164
Id. at n.11.
In his Heller dissent, Justice Breyer concluded that it would be
inappropriate to apply strict scrutiny to the majority's enumerated,
presumptively lawful prohibitions:
“Respondent proposes that the Court adopt a ‘strict scrutiny’ test, which
would require reviewing with care each gun law to determine whether it
is ‘narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.’
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997); see Brief for Respondent 54–
62. But the majority implicitly, and appropriately, rejects that suggestion
by broadly approving a set of laws—prohibitions on concealed weapons,
forfeiture by criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on
firearms in certain locales, and governmental regulation of commercial
firearm sales—whose constitutionality under a strict-scrutiny standard
would be far from clear.”

Id. (quoting 554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also Lac Vieux Desert Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 276 F.3d 876, 879
(6th Cir. 2002) (noting that under strict scrutiny, “[w]e start by presuming that the
ordinance is unconstitutional”).
165
Id. at 691.
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home, this deprivation did not require a strict scrutiny analysis.166 The
court noted that although § 922(g)(4) is an extreme restriction, the class
it affects is narrow.167 Similar to several other provisions of the statute,
§ 922(g)(4) does not place an encumbrance on the public at large, but
rather only on a limited class of individuals who are not deemed to be
at the center of the Second Amendment— those who have been
previously involuntarily committed into a mental institution, or those
who have been adjudicated mentally defective.168
Additionally, in a non-exhaustive review of cases surrounding
§ 922(g), there was a near unanimous preference for intermediate
scrutiny determined by the court.169 Thus, like many of its sister
circuits, the Sixth Circuit held that intermediate scrutiny was
applicable.170 When applying intermediate scrutiny, “[a]ll that is
166

Id.
Id.
168
Id.; see United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010) (“opting to
apply intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(8) in part because the ‘statute[ ] prohibit[s]
the possession of firearms by [a] narrow class[ ] of persons who, based on their past
behavior, are more likely to engage in domestic violence’”). The court added that
“although there is a longstanding prohibition on gun ownership based § 922(g)(4), it
does not necessarily required the court to apply strict scrutiny. Additionally, the
court further explains that Sections 922(g)(1) and (9), which also impose permanent
bans, have been routinely reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.” Id. (internal
citations omitted) (referencing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2013); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011); United States
v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 159; United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d at 673, 682-83 (4th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 689, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2010).
169
Some courts have declined to wade “into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.”
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Greeno, 679 F.3d
510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012). This necessitates selection of an appropriate level of
scrutiny, forecloses this option. 679 F.3d at 518. Nevertheless, even those courts
that have avoided the scrutiny morass have adopted inquiries approximating
traditional intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Booker, 644 F.3d at 25 (requiring “a
substantial relationship between the restriction and an important governmental
objective”); Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641-42 (requiring “some
form of strong showing” that the law is “substantially related to an important
governmental objective”).
170
United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); see United States v.
Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220,
226 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d at 802.
167

As noted previously, courts have consistently applied intermediate
scrutiny to § 922(g)(9)’s ban on convicted domestic-violence
misdemeanants. The Fourth Circuit has applied intermediate
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required is ‘a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that
represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose
scope is in proportion to the interest served.”171 Additionally, the
government need not prove that there is “no burden whatsoever on [the
claimant's] … right under the Second Amendment.”172
In Tyler’s case, the court focused heavily on Congress’s
decision to rely on prior judicial determinations, and reasoned that
there was a substantial relationship between the government’s interest
to keep firearms out of the hands of “presumptively risky people” and
§ 922(g)(4)’s prohibition, even without an option for post-commitment
review.173 In addition to this general interest, the government offered
two additional justifications for § 922(g)(4), protecting against crime
and suicide prevention.174 The Sixth Circuit found these interests not
only legitimate, but compelling.175
The next step of the application required the government to
establish whether the firearm ban, as applied to individuals like Tyler,
was substantially related to its objectives of suicide prevention and
public safety.176 To meet this burden, the court noted, the government
could rely on various sources such as legislative history, case law,
empirical evidence, and even common sense; it could not, however,
rely upon mere “anecdote and supposition.”177
Ultimately, the government relied on empirical evidence and
legislative history to uphold § 922(g)(4) by pointing to legislative
observations about the role of mental illnesses in two public shootings,
scrutiny to § 922(g)(3), which prohibits gun possession by drug
addicts and unlawful users of controlled substances. The Seventh
Circuit has also applied intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(1)’s ban
on gun ownership by felons. Likewise, the Fourth and Tenth
Circuits have subjected § 922(g)(8), which disallows gun
possession by individuals subject to domestic protective orders, to
intermediate scrutiny.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
171
Id. at 693. Neinast v. Bd. Trs. Columbus Metro. Libr., 346 F.3d 585, 594 (6th Cir.
2003) (quoting Bd. Trs. State Univ. N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
172
Id.; Chapman, 666 F.3d at 228.
173
See Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1983); see also Huddleston
v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974).
174
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 694.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Enter. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)).
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the first at Virginia Tech178 and the second in New York.179 The court
reasoned that, although there was compelling evidence of the need to
remove firearms from those currently suffering from a mental illness,
or those recently removed from an involuntary commitment, it does
not justify Congress’s ability to permanently bar individuals.180
Specifically, a firearms ban should not prevent individuals like Tyler,
who have had “healthy, peaceable years . . . [since] their troubled
history” to own a firearm.181
In addition to legislative observations, the government pointed
to multiple empirical and meta-analysis studies which each conclude
that those who have previously attempted suicide are more likely than
the general public to commit suicide at a later date.182 One study
asserted that the most probable method of suicide for these individuals
was by a firearm, aiding the government’s case.183 Once again, the
court in Tyler reasoned that this evidence may be helpful for those who
have previously attempted suicide, but it did not justify the need to
permanently disarm anyone who had been committed to a mental
institution for any reason.184 Nothing in the record suggested that
Tyler had ever attempted suicide, or that a significant number of people
affected by § 922(g)(4) had attempted suicide.185 Tyler continued to
assert that because none of the studies cited by the government applied
to him, he should be able to have his right to bear arms restored.186
It is unclear whether a passage of time alone is enough to
subside a risk of danger to oneself or others following an involuntary
commitment. A separate study indirectly cited by the government
found that previously committed individuals had a suicide risk thirtynine times higher than following short first admissions.187 This study
concluded that suicide risk appeared to be highest at the beginning of
Id. at 697. In 2008, Congress “authorized federal grants to the states for their help
in shoring up the NICS instant background check system after a gunman with “a
proven history of mental illness” killed dozens at Virginia Tech, less than two years
after his commitment into a mental facility.” Id.
179
Id. at 695.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 696.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 696 (quoting 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY at 220).
178
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treatment, and ultimately diminishes as time passes.188 The court
determined that the government did not offer sufficient evidence of the
continued risk presented by persons who had been formerly committed
because the studies only analyzed the behavior of individuals over a
one-year and twenty-two-month period, respectively, and failed to
explain why a lifetime ban was reasonably necessary.189
The court then reasoned that, from 1986 to 1992, federal law
allowed a relief-from-disabilities program where under § 925(c),
individuals who have been prohibited by federal law to possess a
firearm, could apply to the Attorney General for relief.190 However, as
noted above, in 1992, this program was defunded because reviewing
applications was “a very difficult and subjective task which could have
devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision
is made.”191 In 2008, Congress had a change of heart when it
authorized federal grants to the states for their help with the NICS
instant background check.192 To receive this funding, states were
required to create relief-from-disabilities programs that allow
individuals who have been barred by § 922(g)(4) to apply to have their
rights restored.193 The court noted this initiative clearly indicated that
Congress did not believe that those who had been previously
committed were sufficiently dangerous as a class to permanently
deprive all of their Second Amendment right to bear arms.194
The Court of Appeals concluded that Tyler held a viable claim
under the Second Amendment, and that the government did not meet
its burden of justifying a permanent ban on firearm possession to any
individual who has either been “adjudicated as a mental defective” or
“committed into a mental institution.”195 The court expressly said that,
as it “read the opinions, ten of us would reverse the district court; six
of us would not… [a]nd at least twelve of us agree that intermediate
scrutiny should be applied, if we employ a scrutiny-based analysis.”196
Therefore, Tyler’s case was reversed and remanded to the district court
with an instruction to apply intermediate scrutiny to determine §
188

Id.
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 102–353, at 19 (1992)).
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 699.
196
Id.
189
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922(g)(4)’s constitutionally as applied to Tyler.197 Additionally, the
government was directed to provide additional evidence explaining
why (1) a lifetime gun ban under § 922(g)(4) was necessary and (2) §
922(g)(4) was constitutional as applied to Tyler.198 The Tyler decision
suggests that prior involuntary commitment to a mental institution
does not equate to a current mental illness; thus, the federal law should
not automatically bar individuals who were once involuntarily
committed from possessing firearms.
IV.

WHO HAS IT RIGHT?

The three circuit courts addressing this issue have reached
distinctive conclusions regarding firearm rights of those who were
involuntarily committed. First, the Third Circuit in Beers held that
those involuntarily committed were outside of the scope of the Second
Amendment; therefore, the § 922(g)(4)’s categorical ban is
constitutional.199 Next, the Ninth Circuit in Mai assumed, without
deciding, that these same individuals are inside of the scope of the
Second Amendment but § 922(g)(4) is still constitutional under
intermediate scrutiny as applied to those whose commitments were
long ago.200 Finally, the Sixth Circuit held in Tyler, that individuals
such as Tyler, who had been involuntarily committed into a mental
institution, were within the Second Amendment’s scope.201 The Sixth
Circuit held § 922(g)(4) unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny
as applied to those whose commitments were long ago.202
The best approach taken by the three circuits thus far is that of
the Ninth Circuit. The prohibition is a reasonable fit for preventing
suicide and danger to the public because the governmental interest is
compelling, and the prohibition strictly applies to those found
dangerous through procedures deemed to satisfy due process. Further,
scientific evidence suggests a significant increased risk of death by
firearm by those who have been involuntarily committed to a mental
institution.203 Although the Ninth Circuit view may seem overly
197

Id.
Id.
199
Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2020).
200
Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2019).
201
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 699.
202
Id.
203
Harris & Barraclough, supra note 77, at 221 (emphasis added) (defining “the
‘expected’ rate of suicide as either the rate calculated by the authors of the individual
198
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intense, it is in the best interests of both the individual who was
involuntarily committed, and the safety of the public at large to hold
the ban constitutional.
The Court in Heller explained that the scope of a constitutional
right is the product of society’s understanding at the time of
adoption.204 This reasoning falls under step one of the post-Heller twostep analysis, which determines whether the limitation at issue burdens
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment as it was
historically understood. After Heller, nearly every court has held that
intermediate scrutiny applies to limitations that bar the right to possess
a firearm.205
If the Supreme Court was to hear this issue, it should follow
suit with the Ninth Circuit’s assumption and the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis and find that those involuntarily placed into a mental
institution fall within the scope of the Second Amendment.
Additionally, the Third Circuit’s ruling will likely fail because its
finding is contradictory to psychiatric evidence, despite the court in
Beers noting otherwise.206 By deciding that a person’s rehabilitation
is irrelevant regarding forfeiture of Second Amendment rights for both
felons and the mentally ill, the Beers court supports the stigma that
those who were once deemed mentally ill will always be mentally
ill.207 While the court noted that “[n]othing in our opinion should be
read as perpetuating the stigma surrounding mental illness,” its
study or the background rate for the general population of the relevant country,
controlling for years of the study, age, and gender”).
204
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35 (explaining the scope of enumerated rights is the
product of interest balancing at the time of enactment and rejecting the traditional
levels of scrutiny and holding that the Second Amendment codified the English
common-law right to bear arms, which centered around self-defense).
205
See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 823 (9th Cir. 2016) (evaluating the approach
of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits and finding that, postHeller, there is “near unanimity” that intermediate scrutiny applies to regulations that
burden Second Amendment rights). Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775
F.3d 308, 328-29 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to § 922(g)(4)
as-applied challenges).
206
See Debra A Pinals et al., American Psychiatric Association: Position Statement
on Firearm Access, Acts of Violence and the Relationship to Mental Illness and
Mental Health Service, 33 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 195, 196 (2015) (stating that The
American Psychiatric Association's official position as “the process for restoring an
individual's right to purchase or possess a firearm following a disqualification related
to mental disorder should be based on adequate clinical assessment, with decisionmaking responsibility ultimately resting with an administrative authority or court”).
207
Id.
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conclusion that those who have been involuntarily committed are
outside of the scope of the Second Amendment indicates otherwise.
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits diverge when determining
whether § 922(g)(4) survives intermediate scrutiny.208 The Sixth
Circuit ultimately found the lifetime ban unconstitutional when
applying intermediate scrutiny, recognizing two legitimate
governmental interests when applying § 922(g)(4): combatting suicide
and preventing crimes.209 However, the government failed to meet its
burden of establishing a reasonable connection between the provision
and its safety interests, which influenced the court to rule that §
922(g)(4) was unconstitutional.210 Similar to the Sixth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit in Mai identified the same two compelling interests when
applying intermediate scrutiny. 211
However, in Mai, the court determined that the government
met its burden by submitting evidence demonstrating that individuals
who have been involuntarily committed present a higher risk of
suicide, even after a decade from their release; this supported the
conclusion about individuals like Mai posing a continued danger. 212
Further, the Ninth Circuit will likely be found to have correctly viewed
the scientific evidence because Congress need not justify its decision

208

See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2019). (applying the twostep analysis and finding that § 922(g)(4) survives intermediate scrutiny); Tyler v.
Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, F.3d 678, 681, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2016). (applying the
two-step analysis and ruling that § 922(g)(4) does not withstand intermediate
scrutiny).
209
See Tyler, 837 F.3d at 693 (stating both policing crime and preventing suicide
compelling interests).
210
Id. at 699. The court ruled this way because the studies and evidence presented
by the government focused on relapse and readmission of individuals for short
periods of times. Id. The studies relied upon by the government evaluated individuals
for a year after their involuntary commitment, up to twenty months. Id. Because the
data displayed in the evidence did not discuss the long-term risks that individuals
who were committed decades ago faced, the court was not convinced individuals
such as Tyler pose a threat. Id.
211
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1116.
212
See Id. at 1118 (quoting E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an
Outcome for Mental Disorders: A Meta-Analysis, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 220
(1997)) (highlighting a study relied on by the government which evaluated the
suicide risk of individuals for up to fifteen years following their involuntary
confinement and finding that their suicide risk was seven times higher than
expected).
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to uphold a provision with “scientific precision.”213 Because evidence
exists that demonstrates the continued danger of those who have been
involuntarily committed, even after an extended period of time, the
need to uphold § 922(g)(4) exists; thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded
the second prong of the test properly in light of Congress’s public
safety concerns.
Out of the three circuits that have touched upon this issue, it is
likely that the Ninth Circuit reached the proper conclusion and that §
922(g)(4)’s indefinite ban on previously involuntarily committed
individuals into a mental institution is constitutional. Although there
may be individuals, such as Mai and Beers, who are burdened by the
prohibition and may very well no longer suffer from any mental
conditions, the courts are not equipped to make that determination.
V.

CONCLUSION

In 2020, over 43,000 people were killed by firearms, and year
after year rates are increasing exponentially.214 With the country’s
tumultuous relationship involving firearm possession,215
it is
important to understand the limits and implications of § 922(g)(4).
These boundaries are essential to determine who may possess guns,
where they may store them, and when they may use them. As three
circuits have reached three different conclusions regarding the
constitutionality of § 922(g)(4), the need to address this issue at the
highest level is essential. The Supreme Court must reach an ultimate
decision of whether involuntary commitment to a mental institution is
enough to trigger a lifelong ban on firearm ownership and possession.
For the reasons expounded throughout this Note, it is likely that the
Supreme Court’s holding should align with the Ninth Circuit.

213

Id. (quoting Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 984 (9th Cir. 2018)). Congress may
rely on evidence that “fairly supports” its reasonable judgment to sustain legislation.
Id. (quoting Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 969 (9th Cir. 2014)).
214
Past
Summary
Ledgers,
GUN
VIOLENCE
ARCHIVE,
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
215
Evidence Based Research Since 2013, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE,
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls (last visited Mar. 30, 2021) (citing
that since 2013, there have been over 135 mass shootings, over 5,000 homicides, and
over 6,500 suicides due to gun violence).
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